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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
in not heeding the effect of wind and tide on the Christopher Gale.30
Petitioner asserted that the pilot, their own employee, was the servant of
the respondents and that they, by virtue of the pilotage contract, were not
responsible for his negligence, and further, that they were entitled to
affirmative relief in that the pilot was acting as the servant of the respon-
dent. The district court denied recovery. The circuit court affirmed.3 7 The
Supreme Court held that the petitioner would not be responsible for the
negligence of the pilot (giving effect to a pilotage release from liability
for negligence clause) in any damage to respondent's ship, but that the
tow company could not obtain affirmative relief for damage to their own
ship caused by their pilot's negligence. The Supreme Court, however,
hints that perhaps, with proper contractual language, such liability might
attach.
The decision in the instant case sets the law at rest, stating definitely
that a tug, whether acting as a common or contract carrier, cannot by
contract escape libility for its negligence. The Bisso case combined
with the Boston Metals case indicates that the Court will not allow this
rule to be circumvented. The exception in favor of pilotage contracts is
recognized in the Bisso, the Boston Metals and the Nielson cases, the last
named case denying affirmative relief on the basis of such a contract.
Thus, there would seem to be little room for question left in this area.
There will be little chance for a change unless, perhaps, it could be shown
authoritatively that such rules work a hardship on tug companies, that
they are less able to carry the risk of loss than the shippers, that, in short,
the rules are outmoded.
36The Dauntless No. 6, 112 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. N.Y., 1953).
37 United States v. Nielson, 209 F. 2d 958 (C.A. 2d. 1954).
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES
ENFORCEMENT OF INVALID SEPARATION
AGREEMENT TO PREVENT UNJUST
ENRICHMENT
Plaintiff, nearly twenty years before bringing suit, entered into a sep-
aration agreement with his wife at a time when they were living sepa-
rately. Plaintiff and wife were Illinois residents. By the agreement the
wife in consideration of $2,000 paid waived her rights in any property
which plaintiff then owned or should later acquire. Plaintiff, by the agree-
ment, waived his rights to property which his wife owned or should later
acquire. By another clause, the wife waived her rights to support by plain-
tiff. A series of Illinois decisions' has held separation agreements invalid
1 Lagow v. Snapp, 400 Ill. 414, 81 N.E. 2d 144 (1948); Berge v.. Berge, 366 IMI. 228.
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where they have included waiver of support clauses, and plaintiff claimed
that the support waiver invalidated the entire agreement and that he was
therefore entitled to claim an intestate interest in the estate of his wife,
now deceased. A decree in favor of plainitff was entered by the trial
court. On appeal by executrix, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
invalid support waiver did not entitle plaintiff to repudiate his surrender
of rights in his wife's estate after her death. Laleman v. Crombez, 6 Ill. 2d
194, 127 N.E. 2d 489 (1955).
Separation agreements have received changing treatment by the courts
over the years. At one time all separation agreements were held void as
against public policy.2 The courts held that the marriage contract was a
lifetime agreement that could not be released through the private acts of
husband and wife. As divorce became more widely recognized, contracts
in the form of separation agreements became acceptable to the courts if
entered into either after or immediately before separation. 3 Recognition
has reached the extent of enforcing specific performance of the agreement
to live apart.4 However, agreements in contemplation of a future separa-
tion continue to be held void. 5
Two lines of thought have developed regarding the validity of the in-
clusion of support waivers in separation agreements otherwise valid. One
view holds that a separation agreement is valid, whether or not an express
support waiver is included, provided fraud and duress are absent. This
view takes the position that individuals have the right to contract as they
wish, and that the courts will not intervene as to the terms of a contract,
unless there is fraud or duress."
The second view accepts a waiver of claim to a spouse's estate, but
holds separation agreements invalid where there is a waiver of a husband's
duty of support. New York and Illinois have experienced frequent litiga-
tion on separation agreements and support this view, New York by deci-
sion and statute, and Illinois by decision. Both states hold lump sum settle-
ments invalid as consideration for a support waiver. New York, however,
8 N.E. 2d 623 (1937); Vock v. Vock, 365 Ill. 432, 6 N.E. 2d 843 (1937); Van Koten
v. Van Koten, 323 Il. 323, 154 N.E. 146 (1926); Lyons v. Schanbacher, 316 Ill. 569,
147 N.E. 440 (1925).
2 Madden, Handbook of the Law of Persons and Domestic Relations § 100 (1931).
3Sumner v. Sumner, 121 Ga. 1, 48 S.E. 727 (1904); Hoskins v. Hoskins, 201 Ky.
208, 256 S.W. 1 (1923).
4 Madden, op. cit. supra note 2.
5 Terkelsen v. Peterson, 216 Mass. 531, 104 N.E. 351 (1914); Winter v. Winter,
191 N.Y. 462, 84 N.E. 382 (1908).
6 Gore v. Plair, 173 Ga. 88, 159 S.E. 698 (1931). See also the Maryland Statute which
states: "Any deed or agreement between husband and wife respecting support, main-
tenance, property rights, or personal rights... shall be valid, binding, and enforceable
to every intent and purpose ... " although there is provision for modification as re-
gards the support of children. Md. Ann. Code (1939) Art. 16, § 42.
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has stated that a wife cannot validly contract to relieve her husband of his
duty of support, but that a husband and wife may agree upon an amount
of support which the courts will not disturb unless it is found to be gross-
ly unjust and insufficient. 7 New York courts consider the fairness of each
support-providing contract as a whole and have held some valid 8 and
others void 9 depending on the adequacy of the payments and the financial
circumstances of the husband and wife. An inadequate allowance is con-
sidered as a breach of the support duty.
In Illinois, the inclusion of an express waiver of support, if it has been
inseparably interwoven into the contract, has consistently resulted in the
invalidation of the total agreement, 10 and the duty to support the wife
remains unchanged by this type of separation agreement.
"Marriage is a civil contract to which there are three parties-the hus-
band, the wife, and the state ... controlled by law for the benefit of soci-
ety at large."" "One of the contractual obligations of the marriage con-
tract is the duty of the husband to support the wife, and this contractual
obligation cannot be abrogated without the consent of the third party-
the State.' 1 2 Wives, separated from their husbands under a separation
agreement, have, in Illinois, sought and obtained court invalidation of the
agreement and a further court order on the husband for separate mainte-
nance.
In the instant case plaintiff-husband seeks to show the agreement invalid
because of the support waiver, and therefore be able to claim against his
wi(e's estate. This is its distinguishing feature.
The court, in estopping plaintiff from claiming, expressly overruled in
part certain of its most important precedent cases. Lyons v. Schanbacher3
had declared that an entire contract is void if any part of the consideration
is illegal, and,
When valid provisions of a contract are blended with invalid provisions, the
whole contract will be void. "That which is bad destroys that which is good,
and both perish together."' 4
The court, in that case, decreed that a support agreement which contained
a support waiver was invalid and the husband could receive a decree of
partition of the real estate of his deceased wife. Lagow v. Snapp'5 also de-
7 New York Domestic Relations Law (McKinney, 1941) § 51.
s Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 287 N.Y. 21, 38 N.E. 2d 114 (1941).
9Dolan v. Dolan, 296 N.Y. 860, 72 N.E. 2d 603 (1947); Kyff v. Kyff, 286 N.Y. 71,
35 N.E. 2d 655 (1941).
10 Cases cited supra note 1.
11 Leland v. Leland, 319 111. 426, 430, 150 N.E. 270, 271 (1925).
12Van Koten v. Van Koten, 323 Ill. 323, 154 N.E. 146 (1926).
13316 Ill. 569, 147 N.E. 440 (1925).
14'bid., at 574 and 442. 15400 111. 414, 81 N.E. 2d 144 (1948).
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clared that an invalid provision which is a material part of the entire con-
sideration voids the entire contract.
However the court in the instant case endorsed the public policy that
refuses to aid a party who has benefited from an agreement and now seeks
to have it held void. In this case non-enforcement of the illegal contract
would be injurious to the deceased wife's estate, and enforcement would
benefit plaintiff who has already enjoyed the maximum benefits of his
wife's release. Since enforcement of the contract would contravene public
policy, the court held the parties to the terms of the agreement.
In holding support waivers invalid because of public policy, courts seek
to protect the wife as well as the public which might have to support the
wife if waiver of the support duty was tolerated. The court cited Central
Republic Trust Co. v. Evans.1' which stated:
Public policy frequently requires the enforcement of a contract tinged with
illegality where not to do so would produce a harmful result on the persons
for whose protection the law violated exists.17
This rationale for the enforcement of an invalid contract has frequently
been applied to cases involving business contracts, but rarely if ever to
separation agreements.
By overruling the Lyons case, the court has met an important criticism,
viz., that its earlier decision had overstressed the invalidation of an entire
separation agreement because of the presence of an express support waiver
and, as a consequence, had unjustly enriched the husband-claimant. Con-
sistency has now been achieved through protecting the wife and the pub-
lic while simultaneously preventing the husband's unjust enrichment.
16 378 111. 58, 37 N.E. 2d 745 (1941).
17 Ibid., at 71 and 751.
EVIDENCE-REFUSAL TO PERMIT CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF WITNESS AS TO DRUG ADDICTION FOR
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES HELD
REVERSIBLE ERROR
Defendant was convicted of murder largely upon the testimony of an
accomplice witness, and the jury recommended the maximum penalty. The
trial court sustained objection to the following questions by the defense
on cross examination of the accomplice witness:
1. "Are you a narcotic addict?"
2. "Do you take the stuff?"
3. "Did you ever take heroin?"
4. "Didn't you, on March 20th, buy some narcotics and pay $17.00 for it?"
